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THE JURISPRUDENTIAL IMPACT OF
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
KEVIN H. SMITH*
That Brown v. Board of Education 1 had a profound- if not necessarily
immediate- impact on American society is universally acknowledged.
Legal scholars have focused their attention on Brown's impact on the
desegregation of public K-12 schools.2 Their emphasis is understandable.
Brown established a fundamental and unambiguous constitutional principle:
separate public K-12 educational facilities are inherently unequal and
violate the equal protection provision of the 14'h Amendment. 3  And
Brown's immediate effect was to spark an intense, decades-long legal
struggle over the methods and speed of implementing public K-12 school
desegregation. 4
Legal scholars also have examined Brown's significant impact on
desegregation jurisprudence beyond the sphere of public K-12 education. 5
Brown can be read as being limited to public K- 12 education. For example,
the Court stated:
*Professor of Law, Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law, University of Memphis. B.A. 1977,
Drake University; M.A. 1981, University of Iowa; J.D. 1983, University of Iowa; Ph.D. 1994,
University of Iowa. This chapter is an updated version of a paper presented at a university
research workshop sponsored by The Benjamin L. Hooks Institute for Social Change in October
2003 and at a symposium sponsored by The Benjamin L. Hooks Institute for Social Change in
March 2004. The original version of the paper was funded by a faculty summer research grant
awarded by The Benjamin L. Hooks Institute for Social Change, for which I am very grateful.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (hereinafter Brown, Brown 1, or Brown v. Bd. of Educ.). One year
after Brown I was decided, the United States Supreme Court heard arguments concerning the
appropriate standards and methods for implementing Brown I and then published an opinion in
which it set forth those standards and methods. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955)
(sometimes referred to as Brown II). Because Brown I established the substantive constitutional
principle, it is the subject of this paper.
2. James L. Hunt, Brown v. Board of Education After Fifty Years: Context and Synopsis, 52
MERCER L. REV. 459, 552 n.62 (2001) (observing, correctly, that "[t]he secondary literature on
Brown, covering the NAACP legal strategy and the subsequent efforts to implement Brown, is
enormous and ever expanding"); see generally William H. Manz, Brown v. Board of Education: A
Selected Annotated Bibliography, 96 LAW LIBR. J. 245 (2004).
3. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 ("We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of
'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.").
4. See generally JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS
MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY (2001) (discussing both the events leading to the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown and the reaction to it, including several lengthy court battles
to implement Brown).
5. See generally, e.g., Francine Sanders, Brown v. Board of Education: An Empirical
Reexamination of Its Effects on Federal District Courts, 29 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 731 (1995).
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We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of
"separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities
are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and
others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought
are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.6
However, Brown also contains language that can be read more broadly.
For example, the Court stated: "Whatever may have been the extent of
psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson,7 [the Brown
Court's] finding [concerning the negative impact of state-mandated segre-
gation] is amply supported by modern authority. Any language in Plessy v.
Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected." 8 In the years immediately
following Brown, the Court's new understanding of the negative psycho-
logical impact of state-mandated segregation was used by federal and state
courts to strike down numerous forms of state-mandated segregation that
previously had been permitted under Plessy's "separate but equal"
doctrine. 9
It is now well-settled that Brown effectively overruled Plessy and
eviscerated the constitutional authority for any government-mandated
segregation based on the principle of "separate but equal."lO As a result,
legal scholars have come to identify Brown with those aspects of American
jurisprudence that relate to the end of the separate-but-equal doctrine in its
many forms and applications.II
Whether Brown has had a more pervasive influence, an enduring
influence on American jurisprudence that extends beyond the abolition of
the separate-but-equal doctrine, is at once less studied and more uncertain.
If Brown's legacy is to be completely understood, the full extent of its
impact on American jurisprudence must be examined.
6. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (emphasis added). The Court also framed the issue presented in
terms of children and public educational facilities, stating:
We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in public
schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other
'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal
educational opportunities? We believe that it does.
Id. at 493.
7. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
8. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
9. See infra notes 15-19.
10. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
11. See generally, e.g., PATrERSON, supra note 4.
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The remainder of this article is divided into four parts and a conclusion.
In Part I, I briefly observe that an examination of cases decided since Brown
indicates that courts routinely cite Brown other than for its holding
abolishing the separate-but-equal doctrine. In Part II through Part IV, I
examine three purposes not directly related to desegregation for which
Brown repeatedly is cited: (1) Brown as an explicit recognition of the
negative psychological, emotional, and social impacts of discrimination in
its many forms; (2) Brown as an example of when it is proper for a court to
overrule a long-standing and deeply rooted legal precedent; and (3) Brown
as an example of a court's ability to use social science evidence in legal
decision making. And, finally, I conclude that Brown continues to exert an
important influence on American jurisprudence in addition to its influence
on the issue of racial desegregation.
I. THE CHANGING NATURE OF COURTS' USE OF BROWN
The purposes for which courts cited Brown have changed over time. In
the years immediately after Brown was decided, courts cited Brown
primarily in cases involving desegregation issues. 12 In the last several
decades, however, courts frequently cited Brown in cases that do not in-
volve desegregation issues. 13 Brown now enjoys an influence on American
jurisprudence that extends beyond its core holding.
Brown has been cited in approximately 2,000 cases. 14 I began by
reviewing approximately the first 250 cases to cite to Brown (which cover
the period from 1954 to 1963) and approximately 140 of the most recent
cases to cite to Brown (which cover the period from 1997 to 2003). I
adopted this strategy in order to determine whether the attributes of cases
citing Brown had changed over time. And, indeed, this examination re-
vealed distinct and changing patterns in the contexts in which, and the
purposes for which, courts cited Brown.
In the first set of cases, Brown was cited mainly by lower courts in the
context of public school desegregation cases and for the purpose of
reiterating the unconstitutionality of state-mandated racial segregation in
public K-12 school education. 15 Brown also was cited in striking down
12. E.g., Willis v. Walker, 136 F. Supp. 177 (W.D. Ky. 1955).
13. See Part II, infra.
14. All cases discussed in this article were identified using Westlaw, a computerized
database service that is akin to an electronic law library. I generated the list of cases in which
Brown had been cited using the ALLCASES database, which contains all federal and state cases
(including some "unreported" cases) decided after 1944. I used a "terms and connectors" search
with the following search parameters: (brown /5 educ! /p 347 +5 483). To provide a cutoff date, I
used the following date restriction: & da (bef 01/01/2004).
15. E.g., Willis v. Walker, 136 F. Supp. 177 (W.D. Ky. 1955).
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state-mandated racial segregation in public facilities such as swimming
pools and beaches,16 parks, 17 and golf courses, 18 and with respect to ser-
vices such as public transportation.' 9 In these latter cases, courts either (1)
held that Brown directly overruled Plessy and outlawed all forms of dis-
crimination based on the doctrine of "separate but equal" or (2) reached
their decision through reasoning by analogy that state-mandated segregation
of the type at issue in the particular case was unconstitutional because it
produced the same types of harmful effects about which the Court had been
concerned in Brown.
The pattern of use to which Brown was put during the initial period
examined is understandable. Brown provided the legal basis for the many
suits challenging the constitutionality of segregated public K-12 schools in
particular school districts. In these cases, Brown was cited in that part of
each opinion in which the court set forth the case law that governed its
decision. And Brown also was cited, directly or by analogy, in cases in
which courts struck down various forms of state-mandated segregation.
Brown's core holding was never subjected to serious challenges. A
unanimous Supreme Court decision saw to that. Opponents of segregation
framed their arguments in terms of the speed at which, and the methods in
which, desegregation of public K-12 schools should occur. 20 And before
too many years, the applicability of Brown to other forms of state-mandated
segregation also was too entrenched to be seriously questioned. Brown had
served its original purpose.
More recently, courts have had little reason to cite Brown for its core
holding (regarding public K-12 schools) or for its broader holding (striking
down the separate-but-equal doctrine and state-mandated segregation).
Brown continued to be cited in school desegregation cases, but only in
historical context, as part of the procedural overview of the case. 21 Courts
cited Brown in contexts outside of racial segregation, drawing upon ele-
ments of the opinion distinct from its core holding.22 Three categories of
citation usage were evident: (1) Brown as an explicit recognition of the
16. E.g., Dawson v. Mayor of Bait., 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955), affd 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
17. E.g., Tate v. Dep't of Conservation & Dev., 133 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Va. 1955).
18. E.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir.
1958).
19. E.g., Morrison v. Davis, 252 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1958); Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp.
707 (M.D. Ala. 1956), aff d 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
20. E.g., Dove v. Parham, 282 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1960); Allen v. County Sch. Bd., 249 F.2d
462 (4th Cir. 1957).
21. E.g., Valley v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 145 F.3d 329, 330 (5th Cir. 1998).
22. See Part 11, infra.
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negative psychological, emotional, and social impacts of discrimination; 23
(2) Brown as an example of when it is proper for a court to overrule a long-
standing and deeply rooted legal precedent;2 4 and (3) Brown as an example
of a court's ability to use social science evidence in legal decision making.25
These preliminary findings suggested that Brown has had a pervasive
and enduring impact beyond its core holding. Left unanswered, however,
were the questions of the extent to which, and the manners in which, courts
cited to Brown in each of the three non-desegregation categories. I returned
to the Westlaw database and performed three searches, each search being
designed to identify the set of cases belonging to a specific category. In
Parts II-IV, I report the results of these searches.
II. THE PERVASIVENESS OF BROWN'S INFLUENCE:
BROWN AS AN EXPLICIT RECOGNITION OF THE NEGATIVE
PSYCHOLOGICAL, EMOTIONAL, AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF
DISCRIMINATION
The Brown Court minced no words about the negative psychological,
emotional, and social effects of state-mandated racial segregation. The
Court categorically and explicitly stated that state-mandated racial segre-
gation of school children "generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status
in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone." 26 The Court found that the short-term effect of this
sense of inferiority was "to (retard) the educational and mental development
of Negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would
receive in a racial(ly) integrated school system." 27 And, the Court deter-
mined that in the long-term "it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education"
as a result of state-mandated racial segregation. 28
The Court, at least implicitly, acknowledged that any form of state-
mandated racial segregation had negative psychological, emotional, and so-
cial effects when it declared that its determination regarding the effects of
state-mandated racial segregation undermined Plessy. The Court stated:
"Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the




26. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
27. Id. (quoting an unattributed statement by the lower court) (parentheses in original).
28. Id. at 493.
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authority. Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is
rejected." 29
The Court's statements in Brown and my initial review of recently
decided cases suggested that courts might apply Brown by analogy to state-
mandated actions other than racial segregation that they perceive as creating
a sense of inferiority. To investigate this possibility, I used Westlaw to
generate a list of all federal and state cases that include the quotation from
Brown concerning the sense of inferiority created by state-mandated racial
segregation. 30 I removed all cases dealing exclusively with racial segre-
gation and examined the remaining cases.
Brown's influence extends beyond racial segregation and is pervasive.
First of all, the quotation from Brown has been cited at all levels of the
federal court system, that is, by the United States Supreme Court,3' courts
of appeal, 32 and district courts; 33 and the quotation also has been cited by at
least one judge on two state supreme courts. 34 In addition, courts have cited
the quotation from Brown with respect to a wide variety of legal issues
other than state-mandated racial segregation, including law school affir-
mative action admissions programs,35 denial of admission of an all-black
29. Id. at 494-95. For example, the Plessy Court, writing in the context of railroad
accommodations, had stated:
Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation, in places where they are liable
to be brought into contact, do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the
other, and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competen-
cy of the state legislatures in the exercise of their police power.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
30. I generated the list using the ALLCASES database, which contains all federal and state
cases (including many unreported cases) decided after 1944. I used a "terms and connectors"
search with the following search parameters to locate all cases in which the quotation from Brown
had been cited: (brown /5 educ! /p 347 +5 483) /250 "feeling of inferiority". To provide a cutoff
date for my research, I appended the following date restriction: & da (bef 01/01/2004).
31. E.g., City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 135, 153 (1981) (Marshall, J., with
whom Brennan, J. and Blackmun, J. join, dissenting); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 450, 454
(1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
32. E.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 947 (5th Cir. 1996); Yellow Springs Exempted
Vill. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 647 F.2d 651,667 (6th Cir. 1981)
(Jones, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part); Lee v. Macon Bd. of Educ., 453
F.2d 1104, 1109-10 (5th Cir. 1971); United Packinghouse, Food & Allied Workers Int'l Union v.
NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
33. E.g, Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., 964 F. Supp. 597, 598 (D. P.R. 1997); Baldwin v.
Ledbetter, 647 F. Supp. 623, 639 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923, 934 (N.D.
I11. 1984); Hobson v. George Humphreys, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 344, 353 (W.D. Tenn. 1982); Sterling
v. Harris, 478 F. Supp. 1046, 1052 (N.D. I11. 1979); St. Augustine High Sch. v. Louisiana High
Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 270 F. Supp. 767, 774 (E.D. La. 1967); Dawley v. City of Norfolk, 159 F.
Supp. 642, 644 (E.D. Va. 1958).
34. E.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 507 P.2d 1169, 1179 (Wash., 1973); State v. Brown, 108 So.
2d 233, 234 (La. 1959).
35. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 947 (5th Cir. 1996). In assessing the constitutionality
of an affirmative action admissions program run by a state law school, Circuit Judge Wiener, in
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high school to a state athletic association, 36 suspension from school of a
student with behavioral and emotional problems,37 segregation from the
general student body of students with AIDS,38 the constitutionality of a
city-mandated road closure at the border between a white neighborhood and
a black neighborhood, 39 treatment of a trust intended to benefit only white
people,40 the constitutionality of a rule prohibiting co-educational teams in
his concurring opinion, cited to Brown when discussing the potential of racial classifications to
stigmatize, and he stated:
The Court also has recognized that government's use of racial classifications serves to
stigmatize. See, e.g., Brown (observing that classification on the basis of race
"generates a feeling of inferiority"). While one might argue that the stigmatization
resulting from so-called "benign" racial classifications is not as harmful as that arising
from invidious ones, the current Court has now retreated from the idea that so-called
benign and invidious classifications may be distinguished. As the plurality in Croson
warned, "[c]lassifications based on race carry the danger of stigmatic harm. Unless
they are reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial
inferiority and lead to the politics of racial hostility. (internal citation omitted)"
Id. at 947 (Wiener, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). Cf. DeFunis, 507 P.2d 1169, 1179
(upholding an affirmative action program at a state law school the court interpreted Brown as
forbidding only "invidious racial classification-i.e., those that stigmatize a racial group with the
stamp of inferiority").
36. St. Augustine High Sch. v. Louisiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 270 F. Supp. 767, 774
(E.D. La. 1967) (citing Brown in an action by an all-black high school for admission to high
school athletic association, in conjunction with the observation that "[i]f nothing else, the mere
fact of exclusion and segregation of Negroes from whites is injury enough" but that "the effects
[in this case were not limited to, and were] more far-reaching than the hampering feelings of
inferiority and isolation imposed by the segregated system").
37. Bercovitch, 964 F. Supp at 597, 598. The court granted preliminary injunction for
reinstatement and reasonable accommodations under Americans with Disabilities Act,
Rehabilitation Act, and local law to a student diagnosed with attention deficit-hyperactivity
disorder, oppositional defiance order, and childhood depression after being indefinitely suspended
from school. Id. The court quoted Brown's comments on enforced separation, and noting that
although Brown "addressed the issue of racial segregation in public schools, we find the foregoing
statement remarkably appropriate to the matter which is currently before the Court." Id.
38. Doe v. Dolton Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440, 447 (N.D. I11. 1988)
(granting a preliminary injunction reinstating an elementary student with AIDS as a full-time
student). The court cited Brown when discussing the stigma caused by the segregation of students
with AIDS:
The stigma attached to Student #9387 is even greater considering the increased
negative importations associated with AIDS. Further, the Supreme Court in [Brown],
discussing the issue of segregation on the basis of race, stated most succinctly:
To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of
their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.
Similarly, if AIDS-infected children are segregated, they will suffer the same feelings
of inferiority the Supreme Court sought to eradicate in Brown 34 years ago.
Id. at 447 (internal citations omitted).
39. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 136, 153 (1981) (Marshall, J., with whom
Brennan, J. and Blackmun, J. joined, dissenting) (citing Brown while observing that closing a
street at the edge of a white neighborhood sends a message that damages and stigmatizes the
members of the black community who are being blocked from access).
40. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 451, 453-54 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal
citations omitted) (relying on Brown while arguing that Georgia Supreme Court's failure to use
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high school contact sports, 41 treatment of minority principals when schools
close as a result of a plan to end desegregation, 42 racial discrimination as a
form of unfair labor practice,43 employment discrimination,4 housing
discrimination, 45 denial of supplemental social security income benefits to
patients of public mental hospitals,46 treatment of children benefiting from
the cy pres doctrine to prevent the failure of a trust intended to benefit only whites violated black
citizens' constitutional rights partly because it "conveys an unambiguous message of community
involvement in racial discrimination... and 'generates (in Negroes) a feeling of inferiority as to
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone"').
41. Yellow Springs Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass'n,
647 F.2d 651, 667 (6th Cir. 1981) (Jones, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that rules prohibiting coed teams in contact sports might be unconstitutional and
observing that "[t]he Supreme Court's reasoning in Brown .... may prove to be equally
applicable to the intentional separation of female athletes from competition with male athletes...
[although recognizing that] a decision on the stigma question must await a developed factual
record and argument by the parties in another case").
42. Lee v. Macon Bd. of Educ., 453 F.2d 1104, 1110 (5th Cir. 1971) (observing in a case
where a black principal of an all-black high school sued after losing his job when the school
closed that "[wle find it impossible not to conclude that the same feeling of inferiority inevitably
results among the students when the leaders of the educational processes-the principals, the
teachers, and administrators-are likewise separated from principals, administrators, teachers, and
students of other races").
43. United Packinghouse, Food & Allied Workers Int'l Union, v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126
(D.C. Cir. 1968) (invidious discrimination by employer on the basis of race and national origin
constituted an unfair labor practice). The court observed:
The conclusion that racial discrimination may impede its victims in asserting their
rights seems inescapable. This docility stems from a number of factors-fear,
ignorance of rights, and a feeling of low self-esteem engendered by repeated second
class treatment because of race or national origin. Discrimination in employment is no
different in this respect than discrimination in other spheres. In its historic decision in
Brown... the Supreme Court stated: "To separate (Negroes) from others of similar
age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as
to their status in the community that may effect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone."
Id. at 1136 (parentheses in original).
44. Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923, 934 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (denying a defendant's motion
to dismiss in an employment discrimination case, relying on Brown and observing that
"[lianguage.. allegedly used by [the employer], when addressed to black people, as Chief Justice
Warren wrote in a different context, 'generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone"').
45. Hobson v. George Humphreys, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 344, 353 (W.D. Tenn. 1982). The
court relied on Brown when holding upon finding violations of the Fair Housing Act and Civil
Rights Act of 1866 by real estate broker, noting that "the plaintiffs are entitled to recover damages
for humiliation and mental anguish resulting from ... the intentional racial discrimination
[because] they were humiliated, upset and distracted at work as a result." Id. This was to "be
expected, for as the Supreme Court recognized in [Brown] [racial segregation] generates a feeling
of inferiority.., that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Id.
(internal citation omitted).
46. Sterling v. Harris, 478 F. Supp. 1046, 1052 (N.D. 111. 1979). In assessing whether
termination of supplemental security income benefits upon hospitalization in a public institution
was unconstitutional, the judge quoted Brown, observing that "the present legislative
classification, by denying inmates of public health institutions the funds necessary to purchase
personal, non-institutional items, serves to perpetuate 'a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
[VOL. 81:115
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aid to families with dependent children,47 and a state statute criminalizing
miscegenation.a8
The Brown Court's finding that state-mandated racial segregation in
public K-12 schools produces harmful effects has been extended in at least
three ways. First, the principle has been extended to actual, physical state-
mandated separation based on factors such as gender,49 emotional and
behavioral illnesses,50 and medical illness. 51 Second, the principle has been
extended to state-mandated actions which do not physically segregate, but
which have a stigmatizing effect, such as the denial of supplemental social
security income benefits to patients of public mental hospitals. 52 Third, the
principle has been used to recognize that the psychological and emotional
harm that results from discrimination is a compensable form of injury.53
None of these courts cited Brown for its core holding; therefore, Brown
did not serve as the primary legal authority for these decisions. Instead, the
the community ... (and its) impact is greater when it has the sanction of law."' Id. (internal
citation omitted).
47. Baldwin v. Ledbetter, 647 F. Supp. 623, 639 (N.D. Ga. 1986). Considering a challenge
by AFDC recipients to a Social Security Act amendment, the court quoted Brown as it expressed
concern that the effect of the law on "the relationship between the child and the non-custodial
parent [may cause] the child support recipient ... to lose that self-esteem and dignity which
accompanies being supported by one's own family." Id. (internal citation omitted). The overall
effect of the "new found circumstances may be to generate a 'feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone."' Id. (internal citation omitted).
48. State v. Brown, 108 So. 2d 233 (La. 1959). In upholding the constitutionality of a
Louisiana anti-miscegenation statute, the Louisiana Supreme Court invoked the letter, but not the
spirit, of Brown in finding an ostensible state interest. The court stated:
A state statute which prohibits intermarriage or cohabitation between members of
different races we think falls squarely within the police power of the state, which has
an interest in maintaining the purity of the races and in preventing the propagation of
half-breed children. Such children have difficulty in being accepted by society, and
there is no doubt that children in such a situation are burdened, as has been said in
another connection, with "a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."
Id. at 234.
49. Yellow Springs Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass'n,
647 F.2d 651, 667 (6th Cir. 1981) (Jones, Cir. Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(discussing rules prohibiting coeducational teams in contact sports).
50. Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., 964 F. Supp. 597 (D. P.R. 1997) (granting preliminary
injunction for reinstatement and reasonable accommodations under Americans with Disabilities
Act, Rehabilitation Act, and local law to a student diagnosed with attention deficit-hyperactivity
disorder, oppositional defiance order, and childhood depression).
51. Doe v. Dolton Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. I11. 1988)
(granting a preliminary injunction reinstating an elementary student with AIDS as a full-time
student).
52. Sterling v. Harris, 478 F. Supp. 1046 (N.D. I11. 1979) (striking down termination of
supplemental security income benefits upon hospitalization in a public mental hospital).
53. Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. I11. 1984) (employment discrimination case);
Hobson v. George Humphreys, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 344 (W.D.Tenn. 1982) (housing
discrimination).
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courts appeared to view Brown as establishing a general legal principle
regarding the importance of promoting human dignity and self-esteem or, at
a minimum, a general legal principle restricting governmental activities that
undermine human dignity and self-esteem. In either event, Brown served a
facilitative function by providing the courts with an open-ended principle
that could be applied in a variety of legal contexts.
III. THE PERVASIVENESS OF BROWN'S INFLUENCE: BROWN AS
AN EXAMPLE OF THE OPERATION OF STARE DECISIS
Brown was a jurisprudential sea change, a sea change made possible
only by a court overruling a long-standing precedent that had both a
profound importance to existing constitutional jurisprudence and a
profound impact on society. The Brown Court acted, however, without
discussing either its authority to overrule a prior Supreme Court decision or
the circumstances in which it would be appropriate to do so. Despite this
lack of discussion, numerous courts have cited Brown both as authority for
the general power of a court to overrule itself and to illustrate the
circumstances in which it is appropriate to do so. 54 Before I examine these
cases, I begin with a brief description of relevant jurisprudential concepts.
A. STARE DECISIS AND PRECEDENT
Courts at all levels are influenced by the related doctrines of "stare
decisis" and "precedent." 55 Stare decisis provides that a legal issue56
decided by a court of competent jurisdiction remains settled unless the
decision is overruled by the deciding court or the deciding court is over-
ruled by a higher court of competent jurisdiction.57 Thus, for example, any
legal issue properly decided by the United States Supreme Court is deemed
settled unless and until the Supreme Court overrules itself, that is, unless
54. See Part Ill.B, infra.
55. A thorough examination of the doctrines of "stare decisis" and "precedent" is far beyond
the scope of this article. Legal scholars, as well as judges, disagree about the appropriate nomen-
clature, definition, and application of each of the doctrines. And, no doubt, my characterization of
the doctrines will find critics. The interested reader may employ a search of either major
electronic database service, which will yield several hundred law review articles on the topic.
56. To put a substantial gloss on the matter, with respect to constitutional questions, the legal
issue concerns the selection and interpretation of the applicable constitutional provision(s) in order
to determine the existence, scope, and application of a constitutional right. So, for example, one
might characterize Plessy as having involved the legal issue of whether the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection clause permitted state-mandated racial segregation if separate but
(allegedly) equal facilities were provided.
57. See generally William S. Consovoy, The Rehnquist Court and the End of Constitutional
Stare Decisis: Casey, Dickerson and the Consequences of Pragmatic Adjudication, 2002 UTAH L.
REV. 53 (2002) (discussing "horizontal" and "vertical" stare decisis).
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and until the Supreme Court changes its decision regarding the proper
resolution of the legal issue. Disagreement exists regarding the circum-
stances under which a court is permitted to "change its mind" and overrule
a previous decision. 58 It is well-settled, however, that the doctrine of stare
decisis embodies a strong presumption against overruling a prior decision.
Once a court has decided a legal issue, the doctrine of precedent
applies. The doctrine of precedent provides that a court is bound by its own
prior decisions and by the decisions of any higher court in its vertical chain
of authority.59 For example, the United States Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the Fourteenth Amendment is binding on all other federal and
state courts because the United States Supreme Court is the highest court in
the land with respect to the proper interpretation of the United States
Constitution. On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the Fourteenth Amendment is not binding on a state court that
is interpreting a similar provision of its state constitution. 60 Rather, the
decision of the United States Supreme Court is merely "persuasive
authority."
B. BROWN AND STARE DECISIS: THE CASES
My initial review of recently decided cases revealed instances in which
courts cited Brown in conjunction with discussions concerning whether to
overrule a prior decision. To investigate the possibility that courts might
regularly cite to Brown in this context, I used Westlaw to generate a list of
federal and state cases in which Brown had been cited in a court's
discussion concerning whether to overrule a prior decision.61 I eliminated
those cases that simply referred to the fact that Brown had overruled Plessy.
An examination of the remaining cases revealed that Brown has been used
58. E.g. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Thornburg v. Am. Coll. of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986). The Justices' debate concerning when it is
permissible-or required-to overrule a prior decision is discussed more fully in Part II.B., infra
at notes 96-107.
59. E.g., Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?,
46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 818 (observing that "a court is always bound to follow a precedent
established by a court 'superior' to it").
60. E.g., People v. Antkoviak, 619 N.W.2d 18, 25 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) ("Indisputably,
state courts are free to interpret rights in state constitutions differently than federal courts interpret
similar federal constitutional rights.").
61. I generated the list using the ALLCASES database, which contains all federal and state
cases (including many unreported cases) decided after 1944. I used a "terms and connectors"
search with the following search parameters: (brown /5 educ! /p 347 +5 483) & (brown /255
(overrule or "stare decisis")). To provide a cutoff date for my research, I used the following date
restriction: & da (bef 01/01/2004).
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to frame judicial debates concerning whether a particular decision should be
overruled.
Brown's pervasive influence may be measured by the range of courts
that have cited Brown, the nature of the legal doctrine being considered, and
the nature of the legal issues being considered. First of all, Brown has been
cited at all levels of the federal court system, which is, by the United States
Supreme Court,62 courts of appeal,63 and district courts; 64 and Brown also
has been cited by at least one judge on eleven state supreme courts. 65 In
addition, Brown has been cited by courts that considered overruling, or that
actually overruled, prior decisions involving the United States Constitu-
tion,66 a state constitution, 67 state or municipal legislation, 68 and common
62. E.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative
Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147 (1981).
63. E.g., Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 229 F.3d 80, 82 (1st Cir. 2000); Causeway Med.
Suite v. Ieyoub, 109 F.3d 1096 (5th Cir. 1997).
64. E.g, United States v. Sampson, 245 F. Supp. 327 (D. Mass. 2003).
65. E.g., Perez v. State, 620 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 1993); People v. King, 851 P.2d 27 (Cal.
1993); State ex rel. Moore v. Molpus, 578 So. 2d 624 (Miss. 1991); Stamper v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
766 P.2d 707 (Idaho 1988); Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio 1986); Giles v. Adobe
Royalty, Inc., 684 P.2d 406 (Kan. 1984); Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 208 A.2d 193 (Pa.
1965); Williams v. City of Detroit, 111 N.W. 2d 1 (Mich. 1961); Van Dorpel v. Haven-Busch Co.,
85 N.W.2d 97 (Mich. 1957); Gallegos v. Midvale City, 492 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1972); State ex rel.
Sullivan v. Boos, 126 N.W.2d 579 (Wis. 1964); Moskow v. Dunbar, 309 P.2d 581 (Colo. 1957).
66. E.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 833 (discussing, by several Justices, whether it would be
appropriate to overrule Roe v. Wade); Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 747 (same); Florida Nursing
Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147 (considering whether to overrule a case interpreting the Eleventh
Amendment); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 629 (1974) (Stewart, J., with whom
Douglas, J. and Marshall, J. concur, dissenting) (dealing with the proper scope of procedural due
process); lgartua de la Rosa, 229 F.3d at 82 (considering whether U.S. citizens residing in Puerto
Rico have a constitutional right to vote for president and vice-president in national elections);
Causeway Medical Suite, 109 F.3d at 1113 (Garza, Cir. Judge, concurring) (considering the
constitutionality of a Louisiana abortion statute); New Jersey Citizen Action v. Edison Township,
797 F.2d 1250 (3rd Cir. 1986) (considering whether the United States and New Jersey
Constitutions were violated by municipal ordinances regulating door-to-door canvassing and
solicitation).
67. E.g., Perez, 620 So. 2d at 1258 (considering whether to overrule a case interpreting the
application of the Florida Constitution to a criminal case); Molpus, 578 So. 2d at 624 (declining to
overrule its previous interpretation of the Mississippi Constitution's initiative and referendum
provision); Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 699 (interpreting federal and state constitutional provisions
relevant to freedom of the press in a defamation case); Sullivan, 126 N.W.2d at 590 (Dieterich, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the court should depart from precedent and refuse to consider judges
"officers" within the meaning of the Wisconsin Constitution); Moskow, 309 P.2d at 598 (Sutton,
J., dissenting) (examining the constitutionality of a Colorado statute forbidding the Sunday sale of
motor vehicles and arguing that the court ought to overrule existing authority permitting such
laws).
68. E.g., King, 851 P.2d at 42 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting) (dissenting from the
majority's decision to overrule a case concerning sentencing enhancement under state sentencing
statute); Gallego, 492 P.2d 1335 (declining to overrule existing precedent concerning the proper
interpretation of a statute tolling the statute of limitations in personal injury cases against
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law rules. 69 Further, Brown has been cited by courts that considered
overruling, or that actually overruled, prior decisions dealing with a wide
variety of legal issues besides segregation and other forms of racial discrim-
ination, including abortion,70 the Eleventh Amendment, 71 procedural due
process, 72 voting rights for residents of Puerto Rico,73 defamation in the
press,74 criminal sentencing, 75 insurance, 76 alleged medical malpractice and
charitable immunity,77 sovereign immunity, 78 tolling of statutes of limita-
tion involving personal injury suits against municipalities, 79 workers com-
pensation, 80 state law forbidding the sale of motor vehicles on Sunday, 81
sale of real property,82 the initiative and referendum provision of the
Mississippi Constitution, 83 and the determination of whether judges are
municipalities); Van Dorpel, 85 N.W.2d at 106 (overruling a case interpreting the state's workers
compensation statute).
69. E.g., Stamper, 766 P.2d at 707, 710 (interpreting uninsured motorist provision of an
insurance policy); Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 208 A.2d at 193, 207-08 (Penn. 1965)
(overruling the judge-made doctrine of charitable immunity); Williams, 111 N.W. 2d at 9
(prospectively overruling the judge-made doctrine of sovereign immunity).
70. E.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 833; Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 747.
71. Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450
U.S. 147 (1981) (considering whether to overrule a case interpreting the Eleventh Amendment).
72. Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 629 (Stewart, J., with whom Douglas, J. and Marshall, J. concur,
dissenting) (dissenting from majority's action, which was characterized as overruling the existing
procedural due process standard).
73. Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 229 F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 2000) (considering whether
U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico have a constitutional right to vote for president and vice-
president in national elections).
74. Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 719 (Ohio 1986) (Sweeney, J., concurring in
judgment only, and dissenting in part) (arguing in favor of retaining existing precedent by refuting
the assertion that precedent should not be adhered to because of "a dearth of decisional law"
supporting the precedent).
75. Perez v. State, 620 So. 2d 1256, 1257 (Fla. 1993); People v. King, 851 P.2d 27, 42 (Cal.
1993) (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting) (examining the proper interpretation of a state
sentencing statute, dissenting from the majority's decision to overrule a case concerning
sentencing enhancement).
76. Stamper v. Allstate Ins. Co., 766 P.2d 707, 710 (Idaho 1988) (using common law to
construe an uninsured motorist provision in an insurance policy).
77. Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 208 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1965) (overruling the judge-made
doctrine of charitable immunity).
78. Williams v. City of Detroit, 111 N.W. 2d 1, 9 (Mich. 1961) (overruling prospectively the
judge-made doctrine of sovereign immunity).
79. Gallegos v. Midvale City, 492 P.2d 1335, 1338 (Utah 1972) (declining to overrule
existing precedent concerning the proper interpretation of a statute tolling the statute of limitations
in personal injury cases against municipalities).
80. Van Dorpel v. Haven-Busch Co., 85 N.W.2d 97, 106 (Mich. 1957) (overruling an
interpretation of a workers compensation statute).
81. Moskow v. Dunbar, 309 P.2d 581, 598 (Colo. 1957) (Sutton, J., dissenting).
82. Giles v. Adobe Royalty, Inc., 684 P.2d 406, 411 (Kan. 1984) (providing that its decision
to overrule precedent would have only prospective application).
83. State ex rel. Moore v. Molpus, 578 So. 2d 624 (Miss. 1991).
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"officers" within the meaning of the Wisconsin Constitution.84 While these
cases suggest Brown has had a pervasive impact on American jurisprudence
concerning the operation of stare decisis, the more specific nature of that
impact still remains to be discussed.
Although Brown overruled a long-standing precedent, the Brown Court
did not specifically address the doctrine of stare decisis. Rather, after ac-
knowledging that its decision turned on the "effect of segregation on public
education," 85 the Court looked at the then-current conditions in society and
the then-current state of "psychological knowledge" 86 concerning the
impact of state-sanctioned segregation. 87 This line of reasoning implies that
the Brown Court believed a court may overrule a previous decision if the
theoretical underpinnings of the earlier decision no longer are valid and the
decision has a harmful effect. In the absence of a clear statement con-
cerning the theory of stare decisis on which it was operating, however,
Brown's legacy depends upon how courts choose to use these cryptic
statements and the general context within which the Brown Court chose to
overrule Plessy.
Broadly speaking, courts use Brown in one of four ways. First, Brown
is sometimes cited with little or no discussion, apparently as a naked exam-
ple of a court's authority to overrule itself.88 Because the general authority
of a court to overrule itself is so well-settled, one supposes that this use of
Brown represents both a manifestation of the adage that "one should
provide a citation for every legal point" and a means of saying "if the
United States Supreme Court recognizes a court's power to overrule itself,
that's good enough for this court." This use of Brown is content neutral
because it permits a court to overrule a prior decision regardless of whether
doing so has a "liberal" or a "conservative" impact. Thus, this use of
Brown is facilitative, only.
Second, courts cite Brown as authority for the proposition that a court
may overrule itself even with respect to a case that spawned a long-standing
line of authority 89 and even where overruling a case may have a significant
84. State ex rel. Sullivan v. Boos, 126 N.W.2d 579, 590 (Wis. 1964) (Dieterich, J.,
dissenting).
85. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954).
86. Id. at 494.
87. See id. at 494-95 ("Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at
the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modem authority. Any
language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.").
88. See, e.g., Junot v. Lee, 372 So. 2d 707, 710 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (in a "malicious
prosecution" case, relying on Brown, among other cases, to illustrate the ability of a court to
overrule itself).
89. See, e.g., lgartua de la Rosa v. United States, 229 F.3d 80, 88-89 (1st Cir. 2000)
(characterizing Brown as involving a situation that "required corrective judicial action even in the
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impact on society. 90 This use of Brown also is content neutral because it
permits a court to overrule a prior decision regardless of whether doing so
has a "liberal" or "conservative" impact. Again, this use of Brown is facili-
tative, only.
Third, courts cite Brown as an example of a court involving itself in an
issue by overruling a prior case in order to protect a politically powerless
group when the political branches had not involved themselves to remedy
the problem.91 This use of Brown is not content specific; it may be used
with respect to any legal issue. Nonetheless, because of its emphasis on
protecting the politically powerless, this use of Brown presumably will tend
to assist in producing a "liberal" outcome.
The fourth-and most numerous-category of cases cite Brown as an
example of a court overruling a case that is wrong, that is, in error. Several
variations on this theme can be identified. In one subset of these cases,
courts view Brown as an example of a court overruling itself when there has
been a change in the circumstances upon which the initial decision was
based. The circumstances might involve some form of societal change92 or
a change in society's understanding of the proper scope of "constitutionally
protected civil rights." 93 In another subset of these cases, courts view
face of longstanding legal precedent [such as Plessy]"). See also State ex rel. Sullivan v. Boos,
126 N.W.2d 579, 590 (Wis. 1964) (Dieterich, J., dissenting) (interpreting the Wisconsin
Constitution to determine whether state judges are "officers," citing and describing Brown as "the
United States [Slupreme [Clourt's historic school-desegregation decision which overturned the
age-old 'separate but equal' doctrine first announced by that court in Plessy").
90. See, e.g., Giles v. Adobe Royalty, Inc., 684 P.2d 406, 411 (Kan. 1984) ("Retroactive
application of a change of interpretation of the Constitution affects an untold number of persons
and constitutional rights. This difficulty is apparent from the constitutional history of the past
thirty years, commencing in 1954 with [Brown] which overruled [Plessy], thereby making
separate but equal educational facilities unconstitutional.").
91. See, e.g., Igartua, 229 F.3d at 80. The court characterized Brown as involving a situation
that required corrective judicial action even in the face of longstanding legal precedent. In Brown,
the Court recognized that, as the ultimate interpreter and protector of the Constitution, it must at
times fill the vacuum created by the failure or refusal of the political branches to protect the civil
rights of a distinct and politically powerless group of United States citizens. Id. at 88-89 (internal
citations omitted).
92. See, e.g., Boos, 126 N.W.2d at 590 (Dieterich, J., dissenting) (observing that the Brown
Court based its decision at least in part on an assessment of changed role of public education in
American society circumstances since Plessy); Williams v. City of Detroit, 111 N.W.2d 1, 26
(Mich.1961) (stating "it is the peculiar genius of the common law that no legal rule is mandated
by the doctrine of stare decisis when that rule was conceived in error or when times or circum-
stances have so changed as to render it an instrument of injustice."); Van Dorpel v. Haven-Busch
Co., 85 N.W.2d 97, 106 (Mich. 1957) (asserting changed conditions permitted it to overrule
earlier interpretation of a workers' compensation statute although the relevant statutory language
had not changed, and describing Brown as an example of case where "[b]etween th[e] two deci-
sions the Constitution had not changed. Nothing had changed but the hearts and minds of men.").
93. Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450
U.S. 147, 152 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted) (observing he would not
overrule a decision with which he disagreed because it "did not announce a rule of law
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Brown as an example of a court overruling itself when the original case was
wrongly decided and produced harmful effects.94 In a third subset of these
cases, courts view Brown as an example of a court overruling itself when it
came to conclude that the prior decision was somehow wrong or was based
on a mistaken concept. 95 Again, the uses of Brown falling within this
category are content neutral.
fundamentally at odds with our current understanding of the scope of constitutionally protected
civil rights" and citing Brown as an example of when overruling on such grounds was
permissible); People v. King, 851 P.2d 27, 42 (Cal. 1993) (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting)
(dissenting from majority's decision to overrule a case concerning sentencing enhancement,
stating, "It must be conceded that there have been rare occasions in our history when human
progress required alteration of previous judicial conclusions. Abandonment of the 'separate but
equal' doctrine in Brown... is a prime example.").
94. State ex rel. Moore v. Molpus, 578 So. 2d 624, 635 (Miss. 1991) Deciding not to
overrule a case interpreting the Mississippi Constitution's initiative and referendum provision, the
court observed:
One accepted ground for judicial overruling of a demonstrably erroneous prior
constitutional interpretation is that, across the years, it has produced great and
sustained harm; ... if it is 'clearly... hurtful ... .' The test is an objective one, that
[is, that the court] find[s] over time the precedent has repeatedly had a substantial
adverse or significantly harmful effect upon the people. Nationally, we think of
Brown... ([which overruled an] interpretation of [the] Equal Protection Clause that
allowed state-imposed racial segregation).
Id. (internal citations omitted).
95. Gallegos v. Midvale City, 492 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1972) (examining proper interpretation of
a state statute concerning tolling the statute of limitations in cases against municipalities, and
declining to overrule the existing interpretation). The court cited Brown as an illustration that it
was permissible to overrule a case in order to correct error, but decided that the original decision
in the case had been decided correctly. Id. at 1138 (internal citation omitted). Citing Brown and a
state case, the court stated:
We have no disagreement with the proposition that if an error has been committed in
the judicial interpretation or application of the law it should not be regarded as so cast
in concrete that it must live in perpetuity. When such an error is recognized, the same
authority which made it has the power, and should have the willingness, to correct it.
Id. (internal citation omitted). See also Stamper v. Allstate Ins. Co., 766 P.2d 707, 709-10 (Idaho
1988) (Bistline, J., dissenting). In Stamper, the majority adhered to precedent and denied recovery
to the insured. Id. The dissent criticized the majority for adhering to precedent despite an error in
original decision. Id. The dissent cites Brown as authority for the position that a court may
correct obvious error, which he asserted was the case, and he stated:
The doctrine of stare decisis is an important one in the field of jurisprudence: it
provides our society with a certain degree of stability. For example, it enables citizens
to ascertain what conduct is-and is not-permissible. As a result, no competent
jurist takes lightly the task of overruling settled precedent. Nevertheless, experience
often correctly teaches that prior decisions were wrongly decided in the first place.
See, e.g. Brown... (overruling "separate but equal" doctrine enunciated in Plessy).
Otherwise put, stare decisis should not command a blind allegiance to obvious error.
Id. at 709 (internal citation omitted). See also Williams v. City of Detroit, 111 N.W. 2d 1, 26
(Mich. 1961) (overruling the judge-made doctrine of sovereign immunity and citing Brown stating
"it is the peculiar genius of the common law that no legal rule is mandated by the doctrine of stare
decisis when that rule was conceived in error or when times or circumstances have so changed as
to render it an instrument of injustice."); Moskow v. Dunbar, 309 P.2d 581, 598 (Colo. 1957)
(Sutton, J., dissenting) (examining the constitutionality of a state statute forbidding Sunday sale of
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The courts' use of Brown in each of the previous four broad categories
of cases was more-or-less ad hoc, opportunistic, if you will. Brown was
cited when it would advance or facilitate the argument being made by the
particular court or judge. Brown was not cited as part of a comprehensive
explication of a philosophy of stare decisis. In two cases, however, various
members of the United States Supreme Court cited Brown as part of an on-
going debate concerning the proper role of stare decisis in the decision
whether to overrule a case that establishes an interpretation of the United
States Constitution. A full discussion of each side's position is far beyond
the scope of this chapter; however, several general observations are offered.
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,96 and Thornburg v. American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,97 a number of Justices considered the
proper role of stare decisis in their decision whether to overrule Roe v.
Wade.98 In the most recent case, Casey, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter authored a joint opinion in which they discussed their interpretation
of the doctrine of stare decisis and explained the role that stare decisis
played in their decisions not to vote to overrule Roe v. Wade. They asserted
that a case establishing a constitutional principle could be overruled only if
a "special reason" existed, such as an alteration in the facts upon which the
original case had been faced; that the prior decision had been wrongly
decided was not sufficient by itself to justify overruling the decision. 99 In
their view, the benefits of adhering to a prior decision outweigh the costs of
allowing a wrongly decided case to stand-unless there is some additional,
special reason for overruling the prior decision. To overrule a case merely
because a majority of the then-current Court believe the prior decision to be
wrong would jeopardize the Court's legitimacy by making the Court appear
to be as political as the other two branches of government.100
motor vehicles and citing Brown as an example of a court overruling a prior decision when it
"believed the case was based upon a mistaken concept").
96. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
97. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
98. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
99. They explained their decision, stating:
Because neither the factual underpinnings of Roe's central holding nor our under-
standing of it has changed (and because no other indication of weakened precedent has
been shown) the Court could not pretend to be reexamining the prior law with any
justification beyond a present doctrinal disposition to come out differently from the
Court of 1973. To overrule prior law for no other reason than that would run counter
to the view repeated in our cases, that a decision to overrule should rest on some
special reason over and above the belief that a prior case was wrongly decided.
Id. at 864 (citing Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
100. The Justices offered the following quotation from Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co. in support
of their position:
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To illustrate the situations in which they believed special circumstances
would warrant overruling a decision, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter analyzed two occasions on which the Supreme Court had-correctly
in their view-overruled itself with respect to a major constitutional issue.
Their analysis included the following description of Brown:
The Court in Brown addressed these facts of life by observing that
whatever may have been the understanding in Plessy's time of the
power of segregation to stigmatize those who were segregated
with a "badge of inferiority," it was clear by 1954 that legally
sanctioned segregation had just such an effect, to the point that
racially separate public educational facilities were deemed
inherently unequal. (citation omitted) Society's understanding of
the facts upon which a constitutional ruling was sought in 1954
was thus fundamentally different from the basis claimed for the
decision in 1896. While we think Plessy was wrong the day it was
decided, see Plessy... (Harlan, J., dissenting), we must also
recognize that the Plessy Court's explanation for its decision was
so clearly at odds with the facts apparent to the Court in 1954 that
the decision to reexamine was on this ground alone not only
justified but required.
Brown... rested on facts, or an understanding of facts, changed
from those which furnished the claimed justifications for the
earlier constitutional resolutions. [Brown] was comprehensible as
the Court's response to facts that the country could understand, or
had come to understand already, but which the Court of an earlier
day, as its own declarations disclosed, had not been able to
perceive. As the decision [was] thus comprehensible [it was] also
defensible, not merely as the victor[y] of one doctrinal school over
another by dint of numbers (victor[y] though [it was]), but as [the]
application[] of constitutional principle to facts as they had not
been seen by the Court before. In constitutional adjudication as
elsewhere in life, changed circumstances may impose new
obligations, and the thoughtful part of the Nation could accept
A basic change in the law upon a ground no firmer than a change in our membership
invites the popular misconception that this institution is little different from the two
political branches of the Government. No misconception could do more lasting injury
to this Court and to the system of law which it is our abiding mission to serve.
Id. (quoting Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 636).
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each decision to overrule a prior case as a response to the Court's
constitutional duty. 101
The Justices then concluded that no special reason existed for
overruling Roe v. Wade. 102
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices, White, Scalia, and Thomas
disagreed and took the position that the Court had the power-indeed the
obligation-to overrule a case on a constitutional issue when the case was
wrongly decided.103 No special reason was needed. Brown was justified by
the simple fact that Plessy originally had been decided incorrectly as a
matter of constitutional law.104 They asserted that the Court improves, not
undermines, its stature when it overrules erroneous decisions.105
The debate in Casey is reminiscent of an earlier debate. In Thornburgh
v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,10 6 the Court
examined the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania abortion statute. Justice
White, with whom then-Justice Rehnquist joined, dissented from a majority
decision that struck down aspects of the statute. 107 Justice White cited
101. Casey, 505 U.S. at 863-64.
102. Id. at 869; see also Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 636 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart
offered a similar analysis of when it was proper to overrule a constitutional case. Id. at 630.
Concluding that no reason existed for departing from precedent, he observed:
I would add, however, a word of concern. It seems to me that unless we respect the
constitutional decisions of this Court, we can hardly expect that others will do so.
(internal citation omitted) A substantial departure from precedent can only be justi-
fied, I had thought, in the light of experience with the application of the rule to be
abandoned or in the light of an altered historic environment. (citing Brown) Yet the
Court today has unmistakably overruled a considered decision of this Court that is
barely two years old, without pointing to any change in either societal perceptions or
basic constitutional understandings that might justify this total disregard of stare
decisis.
Id. at 634-35.
103. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("We believe that Roe was wrongly decided, and that it can and should be overruled
consistently with our traditional approach to stare decisis in constitutional cases.").
104. See id. at 962-63 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). According
to Rehnquist:
The Court in Brown simply recognized, as Justice Harlan had recognized beforehand,
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit racial segregation. The rule of Brown
is not tied to popular opinion about the evils of segregation; it is a judgment that the
Equal Protection Clause does not permit racial segregation, no matter whether the
public might come to believe that it is beneficial. On that ground it stands, and on that
ground alone the Court was justified in properly concluding that the Plessy Court had
erred.
Id.
105. Id. at 963. ("The Judicial Branch derives its legitimacy, not from following public
opinion, but from deciding by its best lights whether legislative enactments of the popular
branches of Government comport with the Constitution.").
106. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
107. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 785 (White, J., with whom Rehnquist, J. joins, dissenting).
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Brown as an application of the principle that the Court may overrule a
constitutional case solely because it was incorrect when originally
decided.108
The debates in Casey and Thornburgh about the proper interpretation
and application of stare decisis likely never will be settled. Yet, the fact
that Brown is used to frame the debate indicates that Brown will continue to
play a central role in the jurisprudence regarding the circumstances under
which a court may overrule a case consistently with the doctrine of stare
decisis. The relevance of Brown to this debate may be seen by the fact that
several lower courts have cited to it.109 It should be noted, however, that
either interpretation of Brown is content neutral, that is, does not necessarily
lead to liberal or conservative decisions.
Overall, while it appears that Brown will continue to be cited as an
example of the operation of stare decisis, it also appears that Brown's role
will continue to be more facilitative than substantive. Courts will continue
to disagree about the nature of Brown's relevance to the operation of stare
decisis. Courts will continue to cite Brown to justify a conclusion that a
case should or should not be overruled, rather than to provide an objective
rule or test either for when a prior decision should be overruled or for what
the new rule of law, if any, should be.
108. Justice White wrote:
The Court has therefore adhered to the rule that stare decisis is not rigidly applied in
cases involving constitutional issues... and has not hesitated to overrule decisions, or
even whole lines of cases, where experience, scholarship, and reflection demonstrated
that their fundamental premises were not to be found in the Constitution. Stare decisis
did not stand in the way of the Justices who, in the late 1930's, swept away
constitutional doctrines that had placed unwarranted restrictions on the power of the
State and Federal Governments to enact social and economic legislation (internal
citations omitted). Nor did stare decisis deter a different set of Justices, some 15 years
later, from rejecting the theretofore prevailing view that the Fourteenth Amendment
permitted the States to maintain the system of racial segregation. In both instances,
history has been far kinder to those who departed from precedent than to those who
would have blindly followed the rule of stare decisis. And only last Term, the author
of today's majority opinion reminded us once again that "when it has become apparent
that a prior decision has departed from a proper understanding" of the Constitution,
that decision must be overruled.
In my view, the time has come to recognize that Roe v. Wade, no less than the cases
overruled by the Court in the decisions I have just cited, "departs from a proper
understanding" of the Constitution and to overrule it.
Id. at 787-88 (internal citation omitted).
109. Circuit Judge Garza referred to this debate in his concurring opinion in Causeway Med.
Suite v. Ieyoub, 109 F.3d 1096 (5th Cir. 1997) (considering the constitutionality of a Louisiana
abortion statute). See also Perez v. State, 620 So. 2d 1256, 1258-64 (Fla. 1993) (Overton, Justice,
concurring) (discussing Casey at length before concluding he would overrule precedent because
no special reason existed for doing so beyond his belief the original case was wrongly decided).
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IV. THE PERVASIVENESS OF BROWN'S INFLUENCE: BROWN AS
AN EXAMPLE OF THE USE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
The Brown Court's conclusion that separate educational facilities were
inherently unequal rested, at least in part, on the Court's determination that
such facilities had a negative psychological and sociological impact on
minority schoolchildren. 110 The Court stated:
We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of
children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though
the physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be equal,
deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational
opportunities? We believe that it does.
To separate [children in grade school and high school] from others
of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the com-
munity that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone. The effect of this separation on their
educational opportunities was well stated by a finding in the
Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt compelled to rule
against the Negro plaintiffs:
"Segregation of white and colored children in public schools
has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The
impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the
policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as
denoting the inferiority of the Negro group. A sense of in-
feriority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation
with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to (retard)
the educational and mental development of Negro children
and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would
receive in a racial(ly) integrated school system.11
The Court's determination concerning the negative effect of
segregation was based-at least in part-on social science research. In the
text of its decision, the Court stated that its conclusion was based on
contemporary "psychological knowledge" concerning the effects of
segregation. 112 The Court supported its conclusion with a footnote listing
110. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 494 ("Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time
of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modem authority.").
2005]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 81:115
the citations of five social science research projects."13 Thus, the Court
took judicial notice of the results of social science research studies and used
that information as a legislative fact, that is, as the foundation for the
constitutional principle it established. 114
The legislative fact regarding the impact of state-mandated segregation
was, of course, binding on the Court and on all lower courts in the context
of state-mandated racial segregation in public K-12 education. In addition,
the Court's determination regarding the psychological and sociological
effects of segregation was applied by analogy to strike down the separate-
but-equal doctrine as it was being applied to ethnic segregation in public
education 1 5 and in a wide variety of non-educational circumstances, such
113. Id. at 494 n.11 (citing KENNETH B. CLARK, EFFECT OF PREJUDICE AND
DISCRIMINATION ON PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT (1950); HELEN LELAND WITMER & RUTH
KOTINSKY, PERSONALITY IN THE MAKING: THE FACT-FINDING REPORT OF THE MIDCENTURY
WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH, chap. VI (1952); Max Deutscher &
Isidor Chein, The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of Social Science
Opinion, 26 J. PSYCHOL. 259 (1948); Isidor Chein, What are the Psychological Effects of
Segregation Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3 INT. J. OPINION AND ATTITUDE RES. 229
(1949); THEODORE BRAMELD, EDUCATIONAL COSTS, in DISCRIMINATION AND NATIONAL
WELFARE 44-48 (Robert M. Maclver, ed., 1949); FRAZIER, THE NEGRO IN THE UNITED STATES
674-681 (1949); and citing generally GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO
PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944)).
114. One court provided the following-representative -description of legislative facts:
"Legislative facts are those which help the tribunal to determine the content of law and
policy and to exercise its judgment or discretion in determining what course of action
to take. Legislative facts are ordinarily general and do not concern [only] the parties."
By examining scientific articles outside the record of the instant case, we can
determine what course of action to take with regards to the reliability of the [scientific
test at issue in the case]. The facts contained in those scientific articles do not concern
only the parties to the instant case, and are therefore "legislative facts" within the
context of this opinion.
Emerson v. State, 880 S.W.2d 759, 764-65 (Texas Crim. App. 1994) (quoting Weinstein & Berger,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 5 200(03)).
Legislative facts are to be distinguished from "adjudicative facts." Adjudicative facts are "facts
about the particular event which gave rise to the lawsuit and, like all adjudicative facts,. .. [help]
explain who did what, when, where, how, and with what motive and intent."
Id. at 765 (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 328).
115. For example, in Texas Educ. Agency, the Fifth Circuit relied in part on Brown to
conclude that the segregation of Mexican-American students was unconstitutional. United States
v. Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848, 863 n.21 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc), affd after remand, 532
F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1976), remanded sub nom. ("The relationship between racial segregation and
educational, psychological, and social harms was established long ago. We see no reason to
believe that ethnic segregation is any less detrimental than racial segregation." (internal citations
omitted)); see also United States v. Texas, 506 F. Supp. 405, 414 (E.D. Tex. 1981). According to
that court:
The adverse impact of racial or ethnic segregation upon school children is well
documented. As the Supreme Court observed more than a quarter-century ago,
segregation 'generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community which
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.' Such
treatment affects, not only educational achievement, but social and psychological
development as well.
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as parks, 116 beaches and swimming pools,ll 7 golf courses,11 8 and public
transportation. 119
These uses of Brown and the initial review of recently decided cases
suggested that courts might rely on Brown as authority to use social science
research results in other contexts. In order to investigate this possibility,
Westlaw was used to generate a list of such cases. 120
Brown's influence arguably is pervasive. First, Brown has been cited
at all levels of the federal court system, that is, by the United States
Supreme Court,121 courts of appeal,122 and district courts; 123 and Brown has
been cited by at least one judge on several state supreme and intermediate
appellate courts.1 24 In addition, Brown has been cited by courts to authorize
the use of social science research with respect to a wide variety of legal
issues other than desegregation of public K-12 schools, including the con-
stitutionality of two prisoners in a single prison cell; 125 the constitutionality
Id. (internal citation omitted).
116. See, e.g., Dep't of Conservation & Dev., v. Tate, 231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1956).
117. See, e.g., City of St. Petersburg v. Alsup, 238 F.2d 830, 831-32 (5th Cir. 1956); Dawson
v. Mayor of Bait., 220 F.2d 386, 388 (4th Cir. 1955), aff d 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
118. See, e.g., Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93, 103 (5th Cir. 1955).
119. See, e.g., Morrison v. Davis, 252 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1958); Browder v. Gayle, 142 F.
Supp. 707,717 (D.D.C. 1956), aff'd 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
120. 1 generated the list of relevant cases using the ALLCASES database, which contains all
federal and state cases (including many unreported cases) decided after 1944. After consulting
with a Westlaw reference attorney, I used a "terms and connectors" search with the following
search parameters to locate all cases in which the quotation from Brown had been cited: (brown /5
educ! /p 347 +5 483) /250 ("social science" or empirical or psychological or sociological). To
provide a cutoff date for my research, I appended the following date restriction: & da (bef
01/01/2004).
121. E.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995). (Thomas, J., concurring); Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 369 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,
501 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring).
122. E.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 773 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Boggs, Cir.
Judge, dissenting), aff d 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia, 28 F.3d 306, 319 (3rd
Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Lewis, Circuit Judge, dissenting); Dunagin v. City of Oxford 718 F.2d 738
(5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 503 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1974).
123. See, e.g, Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm.,
578 F. Supp. 797, 797, 830 n.96 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Horson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C.
1967).
124. See, e.g., State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1999); Emerson v. State, 880 S.W.2d
759 (Texas Crim. App. 1994); State v. Mitchell, 563 S.W.2d 18, 34 (Miss. 1978) (Shangler,
Special Judge, dissenting); State v. Flemino, No. C5-02-617, 2003 WL 21061236, at *11 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2003) (Randall, concurring specially); Brust v. Brust, 266 So. 2d 400 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1972); City of Pittsburgh v. Plumbers Local Union No. 27, Nos. C 1122, C 1123, 1965 WL 1337, at
*10 (Pa. Co. Ct. 1965).
125. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 369 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (examining
whether the housing of two prisoners in one cell at a state prison violated the constitutional
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).
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of the death penalty; 126 the constitutionality of an affirmative action
admissions program at a public law school;127 the constitutionality of a state
law banning the intrastate advertising of alcohol;128 the constitutionality of
campaign finance limitations;129 the constitutionality of methods of reme-
dying public school segregation;130 whether a jury instruction regarding
cross-racial identification is constitutionally required in certain criminal
cases;131 whether a state voter-purge statute violated the Voting Rights
Act;132 and the effect of racial discrimination by a labor union.133
It is worth noting that these cases do not require that unanimity exist
among social scientists in order for a court to take judicial notice of social
science research. Some courts made this observation to buttress the use of
social science research results in a particular case. For example, in State of
New Jersey v. Cromedy,134 the court relied on social science research to
support a constitutional requirement that cross-racial identification jury
instructions be given in appropriate cases despite recognizing that a "snap-
shot of the literature reveals that although many scientists agree that
witnesses are better at identifying suspects of their own race, they cannot
agree on the extent to which cross-racial impairment affects
identification .... The research also indicates disagreement about whether
cross-racial impairment affects all racial groups." 135
To other courts, the observation that social scientists disagree on
research results reflects a criticism of basing constitutional principles on
social science research. For example, dissenting from a decision upholding
the University of Michigan Law School's admissions policy, which
employed race as a factor, Circuit Judge Boggs observed:
126. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 888 (11th Cir. 1985) (examining the
constitutionality of the death penalty in light of an alleged disparate impact in the application of
the death penalty based on race).
127. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 805.
128. Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 748-49 n.8 (5th Cir. 1983) (assessing the
effect of advertising on alcohol consumption while examining whether a state law banning
intrastate liquor advertising violated commercial speech interests).
129. Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm, 578 F.
Supp. 797, 830 n.46 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
130. Horson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 406-06 (D.D.C. 1967).
131. State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 462-63 (N.J. 1999) (determining whether the United
States Constitution required a jury instruction on cross-racial identification).
132. Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia, 28 F.3d 306, 319 (3rd Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Lewis, Circuit
Judge, dissenting).
133. City of Pittsburgh v. Plumbers Local Union No. 27, Nos. C 1122, C 1123, 1965 WL
1337, at *10 (Pa. Co. Ct.) (concerning effect of union discrimination on African-Americans).
134. 727 A. 2d 457 (N. J. 1999).
135. Cromedy, 727 A.2d at 462.
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Even more fundamentally, social science data as to the efficacy, in
the eyes of one or another researcher, of policies of discrimination
are themselves of limited utility in resolving the ultimate
constitutional issue. At the time of Brown... there were certainly
researchers with academic degrees who argued that segregated
education would provide greater educational benefits for both
races. 136
Such statements not only reflect skepticism about social science
research, but evidence a concern that social science evidence might be mar-
shaled to support contradictory constitutional rules. Indeed, Judge Boggs
went on to state:
Does anyone think that a factual belief in such analyses would
have, or should have, led to a different constitutional outcome in
Brown? I very strongly doubt it. Similarly, research asserting that
Jews and Gentiles in fact interacted more harmoniously under
Lowell's Harvard plan would not justify that policy either. 137
Additionally, at least one court attempted to limit Brown's effect by
arguing that in the particular case the record of evidence, including social
science research, indicated that separate educational facilities did not
produce any psychological harm.138
Other courts have noted that social science research results may be
subject to a variety of conceptual and methodological criticisms.139 Indeed,
even the sociological statements in Brown have been criticized,140 with
Justice Thomas, for example, noting that "[tihe studies cited in Brown I
have received harsh criticism." 141
Apart from the concerns about contradictory and methodologically
questionable research results, some judges have been troubled by the
practice of grounding-even in part-constitutional rights on social science
136. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 805 n.37 (6th Cir. 2002) (Boggs, Circuit Judge,
dissenting), aff'd 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
137. Id.
138. E.g., Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 220 F. Supp. 667 (S.D. Ga.
1963).
139. E.g., United States v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 503 F.2d 68, 84, 85 n.21 (D. Ind. 1974)
(citing articles criticizing the work of an expert witness, the exclusion of whose testimony
ultimately was upheld).
140. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120 n.2 (1995). (Thomas, J., concurring).
141. See id. (asserting "there simply is no conclusive evidence that desegregation either has
sparked a permanent jump in the achievement scores of black children, or has remedied any
psychological feelings of inferiority black schoolchildren might have had").
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research.142 They believe that constitutional rights exist independently,
based, for example, on the original intent of the Framers. 143 Therefore,
these courts would be critical of basing constitutional rights on even a well-
established, unanimous set of well-designed social science research pro-
jects. Typical of statements reflecting this perspective is the following
comment offered by Justice Thomas:
Brown I.. . did not need to rely upon any psychological or social-
science research in order to announce the simple, yet fundamental,
truth that the government cannot discriminate among its citizens
on the basis of race. As the Court's unanimous opinion indicated:
"[I]n the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but
equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal." At the heart of this interpretation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause lies the principle that the government must treat
citizens as individuals, and not as members of racial, ethnic, or
religious groups. Segregation was not unconstitutional because it
might have caused psychological feelings of inferiority. Psycho-
logical injury or benefit is irrelevant to the question whether state
actors have engaged in intentional discrimination-the critical
inquiry for ascertaining violations of the Equal Protection Clause.
The judiciary is fully competent to make independent
determinations concerning the existence of state action without the
unnecessary and misleading assistance of the social sciences.1 44
142. Id. For an interesting examination of Justice Thomas' concerns regarding the use of
social science, see Christopher E. Smith, Clarence Thomas: A Distinctive Justice, 28 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1 (1997).
143. E.g., Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 at 20 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring). For an interesting
examination of Justice Thomas' originalist predispositions, see Smith, supra note 141.
144. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 120 n.2 (1995) (internal citations omitted). See also Dunagin v.
City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983). The court in Dunagin stated:
The writings and studies of social science experts on legislative facts are often
considered and cited by the Supreme Court with or without introduction into the
record or even consideration by the trial court. E.g., Brown . . . (the effect of
segregation upon minority children).
There are limits to which important constitutional questions should hinge on the views
of social scientists who testify as experts at trial. Suppose one trial judge sitting in one
state believes a sociologist who has found no link between alcohol abuse and adver-
tising, while another trial judge sitting in another state believes a psychiatrist who has
reached the opposite conclusion. A similar situation actually occurred here. Should
identical conduct be constitutionally protected in one jurisdiction and illegal in an-
other? Should the fundamental principles of equal protection delivered in Brown...
be questioned if the sociological studies regarding racial segregation set out in the
opinion's footnote 11 are shown to be methodologically flawed? The social sciences
play an important role in many fields, including the law, but other unscientific values,
interests and beliefs are transcendent.
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While both the sociological approach and the specific social science
research results used in Brown have not met with unanimous agreement,
Brown nonetheless serves as the focal point, the organizing case for the
debate, at least within the context of the psychological impacts of segre-
gation and discrimination.
Courts have not confined their use of Brown to cases involving
constitutional issues, however. Several courts have cited Brown to support
the use of social science research results and scientific techniques in the
determination of party-specific, case-specific adjudicative facts.145  For
example, in Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia, Office of the City Commissioners
Voter Registration Division, Circuit Judge Lewis referred to social science
works, including at least one work cited by the Brown court, in dissenting
from the majority's finding that a voter purge statute removing inactive
votes did not violate the Voting Rights Act. 146 And in City of Pittsburgh v.
Plumbers Local Union No. 27, the court based its conclusion in part on
social science research regarding "various facets of discrimination such as
is here established and its effects upon its victims." 147
Brown also has been cited to justify the use of hard science in
determining adjudicative facts. In Emerson, the court took judicial notice
of "it would take judicial notice of reliability of both theory underlying
horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test and its technique for purpose of
determining whether testimony regarding HGN test was admissible as
expert testimony." 148
Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 748 n.8 (internal citations omitted).
145. See notes 145-46 and accompanying text, infra.
146. Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia, 28 F.3d 306, 326 (3rd Cir. 1994) (Lewis, J., dissenting)
(relying upon MYRDAL, supra note 112).
147. City of Pittsburgh v. Plumbers Local Union No. 27, 1965 WL 1337, at *15 (Pa. Co.
Ct.). The court stated:
We would note in conclusion that we have looked to the studies introduced by the City
of a department of the local Urban League in the determination of various facets of
discrimination such as is here established and its effects upon its victims. In the
school segregation opinion, the Supreme Court of the United States supported its
conclusion that segregation has detrimental social and economic effects by citing a
number of sociological and psychological studies: (citing Brown). The lengthy record
doubtless is too lengthy. In accordance with the power vested in the trial judge to
control the course of a trial, limited only by statute and constitutional requirements, we
attempted to use common sense and legal discretion as to what should be here
permissible.
Id.
148. Emerson v. State, 880 S.W.2d 759, 765 (Texas Crim. App. 1994). The court noted:
[Tihat the United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Leon ... relied upon the
technique of judicial notice to gain access to important facts which formed the basis of
that decision. In Leon, the Court cited a series of social science articles concerning the
effects of the exclusionary rule on the criminal justice system, most of which were the
result of the Court's independent investigation. The conclusion of those articles, that
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Courts also have used Brown as an example of the appropriate use of
social science when criticizing courts that have created rules without an
empirical basis. For example, in State v. Flemino,149 the court criticized a
court-established rule permitting expert testimony for the legal conclusion
that a child suffered sexual abuse. The court stated:
The Myers court cited no sociological studies or identifiable and
reliable empirical data to prove that juries in child abuse cases are
so hamstrung by the "enormity of the charge," that they are
helpless unless experts for the state patiently explain to them that,
yes, this minor was sexually abused and yes, when she described
the abuse, she was truthful. There is simply no reliable way to
defend this proposition in Myers. 150
And courts have used Brown as an example of the appropriate use of
social science research while declining to do so in the particular case. For
example, in Brust v. Brust,151 the court declined to resort to social science
research while determining whether it would retain a presumption that the
mother in a divorce case was better suited than the father to care for
children of "tender years." 152
Overall, it appears that Brown will continue to be cited as an example
of the role of social science research in judicial decision-making and that
Brown's role will continue to be more facilitative than substantive. Courts
will continue to disagree about the situations in which social science re-
search is relevant and will continue to cite Brown to justify the use of such
research. Brown, however, does not provide an objective rule or test either
for when social science research should be used or what the new
implications of its use, if any, should be.
the exclusionary rule has a significant negative impact on the rate of prosecutions and
convictions of felony arrestees, was an essential element of the Court's decision to
create a good faith exception to the warrant requirement.
Id. at 765 n.2 (internal citations omitted). See also State v. Mitchell, 563 S.W.2d 18, 34 (Miss.
1978) (Hangler, Special Judge, dissenting) (taking notice of existing scientific research regarding
whether marijuana is addictive).
149. State v. Flemino, No. C5-02-617, 2003 WL 21061236, at *12 (Minn. App. 2003).
150. Id. Footnote 2 in the quoted passage cited Brown and stated: "The use of credible
sociological data in this fashion is exemplified by Brown [at 495 n.ll.].... There, the United
States Supreme Court relied on numerous sociological and psychological studies to support the
proposition and holding that segregation is inherently detrimental to minority children in schools."
Id.
151. 266 So. 2d 400 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
152. See id. at 402 (noting that "[u]nlike the Federal Supreme Court's dilemma in Brown v.
Board of Education, it is not necessary for this Court to resort to sociological dissertations in
construing the jurisprudence of this State.").
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V. CONCLUSION
Brown has had a profound and enduring impact on American
jurisprudence. Brown eviscerated the separate-but-equal doctrine. This is
its greatest legacy. But Brown continues to exert a broader influence on
American jurisprudence.
At its core, Brown concerned human rights, human dignity, and self-
esteem, concepts with no logical boundary on their application. Courts
have seized hold of these themes and have applied them in an ever-
increasing variety of circumstances.
Brown also represented a monumental break with legal precedent, a
break that brought tremendous conflict to the legal system. Despite-or,
perhaps, because of-the Court's silence regarding its theory of stare
decisis, courts cite to Brown as a single example of when it is appropriate to
overrule precedent. The Brown Court's silence has meant, however, that
courts offer conflicting interpretations of Brown and cite to Brown oppor-
tunistically. As it is likely Brown will remain one of a handful of truly
monumental cases in which the Court overruled itself, Brown likely will
continue to be at the heart of any serious discussion of stare decisis.
Brown represents a classic example of the use of social science
research in judicial decision making. Once again, despite-or, perhaps,
because of-the Court's silence regarding its theory of when the use of
social science research is warranted, courts cite to Brown as a signal
example of when such use is appropriate. The Court's failure to provide a
clear statement of when such use is permissible has resulted in courts citing
to Brown opportunistically, whenever and however it seems to support the
current court's desired outcome.
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